Stumbling and Mumbling

Gender, science & stereotypes

Paradoxically, this post on gender stereotypes actually reinforced one perhaps unjust prejudiced stereotype I have - that female/feminist writers are apt to rely on unscientific anecdotes and focus upon trivial everyday irritations. This is unfortunate, because rigorous scientific thinking about stereotypes suggests that women have a genuine grievance.

This paper shows what I mean. Researchers got subjects to compete in a task in which it is thought that men do better - mentally rotating different shapes.

They found that women did indeed do worse than men in such tasks, but only when they knew their competitors' gender:

Information on rival’s gender affects women and men very differently. In the task that is perceived to favor men, it has a positive effect on men’s performance under competition, increasing their performance by almost 60%, but a negative effect on women’s performance when competing, reducing their performance in about 40%.

What's going on here is the stereotype threat, or the "give a dog a bad name" effect. When people are invited to believe that something is "man's work", men step up their effort whilst women become weedy girlies.

Stereotypes, then, are not just irritating generalizations. They have serious and large effects.

I find it plausible that this could have adverse effects upon women's life chances. If some jobs are perceived as "men's work" then women will be less inclined to do them, or might do them worse, even if there is no original rational basis for that perception; it's the perception that creates the reality, not vice versa.

What should be done about this? The answer might not be positive discrimination, such as having quotas for women directors. The authors say:

Affirmative action policies based on gender may in fact have counterproductive effects, since while creating advantageous conditions for women they also make gender information salient, affecting women’s performance negatively.

Instead, I suspect the solution is to challenge the original stereotypes - to show that gender differences either do not exist or, where they do, that they are the result of a social construct, rather than innate biological differences; the work of Alison Booth is relevant here.

Now, it should be obvious from that I say this not to criticize feminists. Quite the opposite. Underneath the trivial anecdotes lies a real and important issue.

A defence of austerity

Is there anything to be said in defence of the coalition's fiscal austerity? Martin Wolf and Jonathan Portes think not. And the Tories' usual defences of their policy seem inadequate. The idea of expansionary fiscal contraction has come as close to being refuted as any macroeconomic idea can be - at least in terms of its relevance here and now. The government's claim to be "fiscal conservatives and monetary activists" is undermined by Osborne's failure to change the inflation target. And the idea that austerity is necessary to retain the faith of bond markets is, at best, an unproveable counterfactual and at worst ("we could have been like Greece") mindless drivel.

So, what can be said for austerity? If I were a Tory, I'd try the following.

The focus of policy should be upon long-term prosperity, not the here and now.

One reason for saying this is that complaints about current high unemployment are mere crocodile tears. If Labour really were concerned about the costs of short-term downturns, it would have used its 13 years in power to improve risk-pooling - either by increasing out-of-work benefits or by encouraging the development of macro markets. It didn't do so, and voters didn't want them to. This tells us that the public behave like Lucasians (pdf), in thinking that the costs of downturns are small.

What's more, the very fact that real bond yields are low tells us that future income is very valuable, relative to present income. We should therefore try to maximize it. And austerity raises long-term growth.

This is partly because there can be a trade-off between stabilization policy and longer-term growth. One overlooked reason for this is that a counter-cyclical fiscal expansion would merely involve spending on unproductive boondoggles that burden future generations. As Britmouse says: "I doubt the Pembury road will ever get priority over the expensive white elephants."

More importantly, though, there's some evidence - not as much as Amity Shlaes pretends, but some - that lower government (pdf) spending can raise long-term growth. Granted, that evidence comes mainly from cross-country research of questionable validity. But two mechanisms make the link plausible.

One is Baumol's cost disease. Government, by its very nature, has low productivity growth. This means that having a big government condemns us to low growth by simple maths. Worse still, the rising relative cost of government over time will crowd out the private sector - and the bigger government is, the sooner it will do so.

The other is that, in the long-run, social norms matter. The persistence of big government threatens to create a norm in which young people to look for safe public sector jobs in sclerotic hierarchies, which would divert talent away from the private sector towards low-productivity-growth work. This could choke off future growth. Also, prolonged austerity now is creating low or negative real interest rates. This will encourage youngsters in future to take on more debt - because macroeconomic conditions in our formative years shape our behaviour (pdf) throughout our lifetime. In this sense, austerity today will encourage borrowing in future - maybe for consumption but maybe too to set up businesses. This too should raise future growth.

As for why we should cut now, there are two reasons. One is that it's what the public want: Labour's offer of (slightly) smaller and later spending restraint was rejected by the voters.The other is that the sooner we start cutting, the easier it will be in future - partly because the objections will be out of the way, and partly because once we get into habits, it's easier to stick to them.

Now, I suspect this sort of argument makes more sense than the standard Tory ones - though that's a low bar. As for how much sense it makes, I'm not sure.

Sexism, deunionization & inequality

Is sexism partly to blame for the decline of trades unions? A new paper suggests so. It finds "a negative and statistically significant link between workplace union density and gender diversity" and says:

The increase in the labour market participation of women in the face of gender discrimination may increase friction between female and male employees within the workplace. This may, in turn, pose challenges in the way of coalition building, which unions need to achieve in order to succeed.

In other words, it might be no accident that the increase in female employment since the 70s has coincided with declining unionization; the former might be one cause (not the only one, of course) of the latter.

Intuitively, we shouldn't be too surprised at this. There's sad evidence that ethnic diversity weakens social solidarity and the building of pro-redistribution coalitions. Mightn't the same be true for gender diversity?

You can read this in two different ways.

You could say that the decline of unions is (partly) due to men's sexism, a reluctance to unionize with women.

Alternatively, you could ascribe it to the increased gender mix of workplaces.

It is, of course, the interaction of the two that does the damage.

This raises an awkward point. The decline of unions since the 70s has contributed (pdf) to rising wage inequality. If increased gender equality (in the sense of more job opportunities for women) has contributed to the decline of unions, then it follows that greater gender equality has been a cause of reduced income equality. Rick recently noted, rightly, that "We are more economically unequal but less socially unequal than we were three decades ago." But he didn't add that the latter might be a cause of the former.In this sense, there are - at least for given (sexist) norms - potential trade-offs between different types of equality.

Unemployment: a river not a pool

The ONS released some important data today that deserve more attention - the unemployment flows numbers. These show several points of interest:

1. In Q1, 530,000 people moved from unemployment into work. That's over one-in-five of all the unemployed. Even in a depressed economy, folk have a fair chance of finding work.

2. In the same quarter, 342,000 moved from economic inactivity to work. These represent 15.1% of the economically inactive people who'd like a job. The chances of moving from inactivity to work are not much lower than the chances of moving from unemployment to work. This suggests that very many of the inactive are disguised unemployed. With 2.34 million of the inactive saying they'd like a job, this could mean that unemployment is much greater than official figures suggest.

3. Almost as many people moved from inactivity to unemployment (438,000) as moved from employment to unemployment (443,000).This also suggests that the distinction between inactivity and unemployment is fuzzy.

4. 902,000 moved from employment to unemployment or inactivity in Q1. This represents 3.3% of all in employment. This suggests that, over a three month period, the average worker has a one-in-30 chance of losing their job.(This underestimates job insecurity, as it excludes folk who lose their job buy find another within the quarter.)

5. Of those 902,000, 459,000 moved into inactivity and 443,000 moved into unemployment. This tells us that unemployment is a poor measure of people who have lost their jobs, as less than half of those doing so actually become unemployed.

The overall picture here is that we should not speak of a "pool" of unemployment. Rather, the unemployment number is a snapshot of a quite fast-flowing river.Such a snapshot fails to capture the fact that job insecurity is high, and that more people want to work than the headline unemployment figures suggest.

For more on UK unemployment flows, check out the work of Jennifer Smith.

The coming crisis of Conservatism

Tory ministers have told British business to stop whinging and work harder. These remarks are more significant than generally thought.I suspect they are the bewildered howls of frustration of men who realize that their god has failed them.

What I mean is that, for at least 40 years the central tenet of Conservative economic thinking has been that if only government could "get out of the way", entrepreneurial spirits would be unleashed and the economy would grow.

This belief has not always been wrong. But it is now. Record-low interest rates, a quiescent labour force and the (prospect of) a public spending squeeze has not boosted the private sector. British businesses' get up and go has got up and gone. Quite why this is so is a long story, but it involves:

- the dearth of investment opportunities, due to a lack of monetizable innovations and the migration of low-wage industry to Asia.

- the fact that geography is against the UK. It shackles us to the euro area, and men rarely swim strongly when they are tied to a drowning man.Today's figures show that export volumes grew just 0.3% in the last 12 months, quashing hopes that we can export our way out of austerity.

- the absence of credit growth.

These factors don't just mean that Osborne's hopes of expansionary fiscal contraction are misplaced. They bring into question a decades-old Tory ideology of faith in business and smaller government.

The question is: where does this leave Tory economic thinking? The right's answer is to double up, and demand more cuts in taxes and spending - apparently ignorant of balanced budget multipliers. Ministers' answer seems to be just exhortations to business to do better, accompanied, I suspect, by the hope that something will turn up.

But what if it doesn't? I suspect we'll then see a crisis of Conservatism of the sort that afflicted Labour for years after the collapse of social democracy in the 1970s.

An equality multiplier?

Why are some countries more equal than others? A new paper by Erling Barth and Karl Ove Moene has an explanation - the equality multiplier.

This consists of two mechanisms:

1. A wage equalizing effect. A generous welfare state - decent unemployment benefits - reduces the threat of the sack. It thus empowers the low paid to push for higher wages.

2. An equality magnifiying effect.Greater wage equality means higher incomes for those on below-average wages, and higher incomes increase people's willingness to pay the taxes that fund social insurance - especially to the extent that those on below-average incomes are more vulnerable to the shocks (such as unemployment) that the welfare state provides against.

These two mechanisms feed off each other, in such a way that equality multiplies. This helps explain an otherwise curious fact - that countries that have more pre-tax equality also have more generous welfare states; contrast Scandinavia with the UK or US.

If this is right, social democrats should rejoice, as it implies that quite a small move towards equality can generate moves to even more equality. For example, better unemployment benefits increase workers' bargaining power, which increases their wages, which in turn makes them more willing to fund a welfare state.

However, there are two dangers here. One is that the multiplier works both ways: it can magnify inequality too. Barth and Moene write: 

Higher inequality means lower incomes relative to the mean for a majority of voters. With a lower income each of them would like to allocate a larger share of it to immediate consumption rather than to tax-financed welfare programs with less direct benets. Thus, increasing wage inequality means a declining electoral support for a larger welfare state.

This passage, though, highlights a problem I have. Is it really true that, as the incomes of the relatively poor increase, they become more willing to pay tax and less desirous of higher personal consumption? Certainly, this can happen in some times and places. But isn't there instead the opposite danger? As the worse-off become better off, their support for a welfare state might decline, because they will have to pay for it themselves, rather than rely upon better-off others doing so. Similarly, if moderately well-off workers become better off, their willingness to support others might decline, as welfare benefits are seen to go to "scroungers" rather than neighbours. In cases like these, we moves towards equality actually backfire; as Nick says, a similar thing can be true for social equality too.

I only take one conclusion from this. It's that egalitarian policies, and the social basis of them, interact, perhaps in complex ways that are sensitive to initial conditions, (changing) social norms, cognitive biases and the precise distribution of income and perceptions thereof. In this sense, moves towards or away from egalitarianism have genuinely unforeseeable effects - which egalitarians might or might not like.

Private schools' advantage

Michael Gove's speech decrying the domination of the privately-educated has reignited an old debate. But there are two important distinctions to be made here.

One is: does private schooling confer advantages merely through the quality of its education, or does it confer them even beyond this?

If private schools merely offer better education, you'd expect their pupils to get more A levels and places at Oxbridge, but you wouldn't expect them to go on to succeed more than state school pupils with the same qualifications.

However, two pieces of evidence suggest they do better than this. One is that, as the Sutton Trust has shown, the top professions comprise more former private school children than one would expect from their roughly 50-50 share of Oxbridge students. The other is that men from independent schools earn almost 7% more (pdf) than men from social classes IV and V, even controlling for the type and quality of the degree they have.

This implies that you cannot eliminate the advantage that private schools have over state schools merely by eliminating their educational superiority - not that this is feasible, given how expensive it would be. Worrying about teacher quality and class sizes, as Gove does, is therefore not the whole story. Yes, it's a (big) part of the story. But not the whole of it.

The second question is: does private schooling actually cause these non-educational differences, or is it correlated with them?

What I mean is that they are likely to be due to things such as greater confidence, ambition, a sense of entitlement to top jobs and social networks.But it's quite possible that these would exist even if private schools did not, simply because they would be transmitted from rich parents to rich kids anyway.

What I'm saying here is that abolishing private education, as George Monbiot and Laurie Penny advocate, is not sufficient - whether it's desirable or not. The advantages of the rich would exist even if private schools were abolished. I agree with Shuggy: if you want to increase equality of opportunity and social mobility - and I'm not sure how many people do - you need to reduce economic and social inequality.

Another thing: I suspect that the disadvantage bright state-educated kids have against private school kids is smaller in the City than in the media - that Jim O'Neill is less atypical in finance than Paul Mason is at the BBC. Is this just me, or is there hard evidence for it?

Yet another thing: Given the prevalence of public school kids in acting, music and sport (other than football), I suspect an under-rated benefit of private schools is not so much their formal academic superiority, as the better extra-curricular education they offer. 

Ordering effects, luck & rationality

I point out here that people's choices can be sensitive to arbitary differences in the order in which options appear. In the Eurovision song contest, for example, the first or later performers have more chance of winning than those appearing in the middle of the show. I omitted to add that this ordering effect also matters in politics. A new paper concludes:

Alphabetic ordering effects exist in the 1977 2011 Irish general elections. The effect is significant, in both a statistical and substantive sense. The estimated effect of being listed first on an alphabetical ballot paper in an Irish general election is approximately 544 first preference votes or 1.27 percentage points for the average candidate.

This corroborates findings from the US (pdf) and Australia (pdf).

Experimental evidence (pdf) suggests such an effect might exist in UK council elections if not general elections.However, it's worth noting that 191 of our 650 MPs (29.4%) have names beginning with A-E, compared to only 54 (8.3%) with names beginning U-Z. 

And it's not just in politics that an early name has an advantage; in football, acting and academia (pdf), early names are more likely to scoop big prizes.

All this might sound quirky. But it's not. It has two implications.

One is that it confirms the message of Ed Smith's Luck. Success depends in (large?) part not (just) upon ability and hard work, but upon fortune. Clearly, the successful have an interest in denying this. But if luck operates through subtle, smallish and non-obvious mechanisms such as naming effects, they might not be fully aware of it. 

Secondly, ballot order effects suggest that electoral outcomes are not entirely the rational will of the people, but are also influenced by luck. And if something as arbitrary as alphabetical order influences elections, how many other arbitrary or non-rational factors might also do so? 

Economic freedom & social tolerance

Tim professes amazement that the Guardian's new human rights site ignores economic freedoms. This raises the question: what's the link between economic liberty and social liberties?

Highfalutin talk about freedom being indivisible isn't much help here, if only because so many folk think otherwise. For every Guardianista who favours gay rights but dislikes economic liberty, there's a Conservative with the opposite preference.

Nor is UK history much guide. If we compare now to the 1970s, we probably have more economic liberty, by Tim's lights, than we did then and there's less homophobia, sexism and racism. That suggests a positive relationship between social and economic freedoms. But if we compare now to the late 19th century, we have less economic liberty but more freedom for women and gays. That suggests a negative relationship between economic and social freedom.

Luckily, a new paper by Niclas Berggren and Therese Nilsson sheds some light here. In a cross-country study of 65 countries, they find that economic freedom is significantly positively correlated with tolerance of homosexuals, but has no significant link with racial tolerance. Cynics might say this is because the selfishness generated by economic liberty causes people to care about house prices more, and gay people help to raise these, but I suspect this isn't the only story.

Curiously, there are two particular aspects of economic freedom that encourage tolerance of gays. One is legal protection of property rights, and the other is low and stable inflation; a credible inflation target reduces homophobia. The size of government, openness to trade and extent of regulation seem irrelevant. The authors say:

Stability, safety and an expectation of fairness (in the legal and monetary systems) are conducive to not regarding others as threatening.

There's something here, I think, for everyone. On the one hand, Guardianistas can point to the lack of link between economic liberty and many aspects of tolerance as evidence that economic liberty is separate from many social freedoms. But on the other hand, economic libertarians can point to the fact that there's no evidence that economic freedom reduces social liberties, and some evidence that, in one respect at least, it increases them.

Danny O'Donoghue, meet game theory

For me, one of the most interesting economic issues of recent weeks is not Greece, or the failure of Osborne's fiscal austerity, or NGDP targeting, or any of that bigthink guff. It is Danny O'Donoghue's claim that The Voice will attract more talent next year than other talent shows.

I'm not sure. Let's grant Danny's premise that The Voice is more musically credible than the X Factor. Does it follow that the best singers will go into The Voice?

No. We can think of the problem facing singers as being much like the hawk-dove game, where good singers are hawks and poor ones doves: let's rename it the Kate-Jedward game.

If Jedwards know The Voice will be populated by Kates, they'll not enter as they know they'll lose.They'd prefer to compete against other Jedwards.

But think of the expected payoff to Kates from competing against other Kates. We can write it as p(Vv) - (1-p)Cv, where p is the probability of winning, Vv is the prize on The Voice and Cv is the cost of defeat on The Voice.

The problem here is that p is low, as Kate is competing against other great singers. It's not obvious that this would be offset by a more favourable Cv; the benefits of getting exposure on a more credible music show and being tutored by better people. It's quite possible, therefore, that for reasonable values of p, Vv and Cv, some Kates would rather go onto the X Factor, where p is higher as they'll be up against more doves.

But of course, if many Kates do this, p won't be much higher on the X Factor.

The solution here is for singers to use a mixed strategy. Some will enter the tough competition - The Voice - and some the easy one. The two can therefore co-exist. In this sense, Danny is wrong.

But there are (at least) two factors here which make things more complicated than a standard hawk-dove game.

One is that singers don't know their true ability or - what is not the same thing! - their chances of winning. Overconfident singers would prefer the show with the higher pay-off to winning, whilst underconfident ones would prefer the weaker competition. This might well cause overconfident Jedwards to enter The Voice whilst underconfident Kates enter the X Factor. This would reinforce the tendency for the two to co-exist.

The other problem is that in a standard hawk-dove game, the best thing for a hawk is to be the sole hawk in a field of doves. But this is not true in our case. The best thing for a Kate is to be up against enough other Kates to make a competition attractive to viewers, but not against so many as to dilute the chances of winning.The payoff to competing against other Kates is thus n-shaped in their number.

The issues here are - of course - not about TV shows, but about the economy generally. There are (at least) three implications here:

1.Apparently quite simple choices quickly become tricky when we allow for strategic interaction, uncertainty about probabilities, payoffs and costs and cognitive biases.

2. It is not always true that a stable equilibrium will arise if identical people, facing the same incentives, choose the same behaviour. Sometimes, stability arises only when apparently identical people faced with the same incentives actually behave differently.This applies to the banking system (pdf).

3.There are costs to competition. A mixed strategy, yielding a mixed population of hawks and doves is evolutionarily stable. But this only arises after a lot of hawks and doves have been killed by entering the "wrong" competition. 

Openness in policy-making

The government has refused to publish the risk assessment of its NHS reforms, claiming that doing so "could harm the quality of future advice from civil servants." Andrew Lansley says:

There...needs to be safe space where officials are able to give ministers full and frank advice in developing policies and programmes.

This makes little sense to me. Think of this in terms of incentives: how would openness reduce civil servants' incentives to give full and frank advice? Surely, the knowledge that your thinking will be publicized increases your incentives to do better, simply because it imposes an extra cost - public derision - upon bad thinking.

The counter-argument, I suppose, is that some "full and frank" advice consists of devil's advocate-type arguments - outrageous thoughts intended to clarify issues. But such arguments could be flagged as such in the minutes.

There's some quasi-experimental evidence which I think favours transparency. There's one area of policy-making which, pretty much around the world, has become more transparent in recent years - monetary policy. And whilst lots of people have complaints about central bankers, nobody AFAIK blames their failings upon excessive transparency. If openness is good enough for monetary policy, why shouldn't it be good elsewhere?

In fact, there must be a presumption of openness, simply because it is voters who pay for policy. As Joe Stiglitz said in this marvellous lecture (pdf):

Information gathered by public officials at public expense is owned by the public.

What's more, there are at least four arguments against secrecy:

1. As US Senators Moynihan and Wyden said, it "breeds inefficiency by providing cover for the influence of special interests and opening the door to corruption and bribery."

2. It allows bad thinking to escape scrutiny.

3. It breeds distrust. The public will ask: "what have you got to hide?" At a time when politicians are already deeply distrusted, this danger is especially acute.

4. It is anti-democratic. It supposes that there is some information which is only safe in the hands of an elite, and with which the public cannot be trusted.

On this last point, though, perhaps Mr Lansley is onto something. Maybe the quality of public thinking and of democratic debate is so bad, so debased by cognitive biases or by media manipulation, that the risk assessment would be misinterpreted. And maybe the government's rhetorical and political skills are so scant that it cannot correct such misinterpretations. But this poses the question: do we really want to be governed by people who are both sceptical of the value of democracy and lacking in political skills?

There is, of course, another possibility. Maybe he really has got something to hide.

The left & shareholder activism

The resignations of Andrew Moss at Aviva and Sly Bailey at Trinity Mirror suggest that investors are becoming more intolerant of high pay for poor performance. However, I'm not sure if the Left should welcome this new shareholder activism.

For one thing, if shareholders do become fussier about who they employ as CEOs, pay could rise even further, as firms chase the (vanishingly) scarce talent to add value to a company.In this sense, inequality could actually increase.

And for no good reason. There's good evidence that heightened incentives - big pay for good performance and the heave-ho for bad - do not in fact improve individuals' performance. This could be because of the Yerkes-Dodson effect; people choke under pressure. Or it could be because extrinsic motivations crowd out (pdf) intrinsic ones, and incentivize conformity rather than creativity. Or it could be because high incentives merely encourage CEOs to game the system, for example by hitting earnings expectations by using accounting tricks rather than genuinely good management. A increased threat of the sack might merely intensify these adverse effects.

But even if shareholder activism does encourage managers to raise profits, it might not benefit the wider economy.

To a very large extent, aggregate profits are due not to individual firms' endeavours but to macroeconomic conditions. Many attempts to increase profits or cashflow - for example by cutting wage or materials costs or reducing investment - thus attempt to raise profits for one firm merely at the expense of others.

And it's possible that such attempts would be collective self-defeating. If all firms try to cut costs, all that happens is that aggregate demand falls. Just as there's a paradox of thrift, there's also a paradox of profits. This helps explain the curious fact that since the 1980s there has been increased emphasis upon shareholder value, and an increased demand for management - and yet there's been no obvious increase in trend GDP growth.

Yes, it's tempting for egalitarians to crow over the fate of Moss and Bailey. But let's be clear. The pursuit of shareholder value is not oviously something we should welcome.

Expectations: a weak lever

My claim that expectations are a weak lever for policy has been questioned. Nick says:

Expectations matter a lot for the demand for long-lived assets, and hence for the price of long-lived assets. The lower the rate of interest, the more expectations matter. What happens this year doesn't matter very much at all (unless it affects expectations of future years), and it matters even less as the rate of interest gets lower.

This seems reasonable. But it has an implication which doesn't always fit the facts. It implies that as long-term real interest rates fall, the price of "growth" stocks should rise relative to value stocks. This is because growth stocks - by definition - are expected to offer more future cashflows than value ones, and lower interest rates raise the value of future cashflows. But my chart shows that this isn't always so. Between 2007 and 2010, growth stocks did indeed out-perform as index-linked yields fell. But since 2011 they have not done so. This tells us that the link between longer-lived assets and interest rates isn't as simple as theory tells us. This might be because the stock market is short-termist (pdf) and so longer-term expectations just don't matter much.

This, though, was not the main point I had in mind. I was thinking instead of my second chart, which shows NOP's survey of the public's expectations for inflation in the following 12 months.This chart shows three things:

1. Expectations are not well anchored to the 2% target. Instead, as Adam Posen has said (pdf), they are determined more by the recent data. This poses the question: if the inflation target does not much affect short-term inflation expectations, why should we suppose that an NGDP target would much affect short-term NGDP expectations?

2. Inflation expectations have been above 3% since May 2010. This implies that the public has expected sharply negative real interest rates. But this has not led to the rise in consumer spending that theory predicts.In January 2011, the consensus expected real consumer spending to grow 1.2%. In fact it fell 1.2%.

3.Nor have high inflation expectations led to higher wage growth; average earnings have risen 1.4% a year in nominal terms in the last two years.

These three facts imply that there are two weaknesses in the expectations lever; the Bank cannot easily affect short-term expectations, and such expectations don't obviously have the effects on macroeconomic aggregates that one might think.

Now, I agree that, in theory, policy credibility matters. And I don't doubt that there are times and places when policy-makers can affect expectations; I suspect they have more influence upon financial market expectations than real people's. I fear, though, that economists who invoke "expectations" and "credibility" are making the error of mistaking the tidy maps of models for the messy terrain of reality.

I do not say this to reject NGDP targets. Instead, it is to say that - insofar as these have merit for the UK economy here and now - it is because they would lead to a greater monetary stimulus, rather than because they would affect expectations and hence behaviour.

The media vs bloggers

As one of the more, ahem, seasoned bloggers, I can remember when mainstream journalists looked down upon us as "socially inadequate" angry ranters who were no replacement for serious journalism. But I'm starting to think that the opposite is increasingly the case. It is mainstream journalism that comprises linkbait (Samantha Brick), trolls ("Rod" Liddle, A.A Gill, The Mail's nastiness towards female celebs) and shallow self-absorbed diarists, whilst many bloggers are serious, intellectual and high-minded.

I suspect there are two pressures which might amplify the tendency for bloggers to go "up market" and the mainstream media down.

One is incentives. Many bloggers blog in order to build a reputation, whereas the paid media needs eyeballs. Linkbait that attracts eyeballs - if only ones connected to brains which think "this woman is a moron" - are good for the media, but no use to a blogger who wants to advance a reputation for intelligence. The (I fear distant) possibility that academics will get professional credit for blogging would exacerbate this difference.

In this context, we shouldn't bemoan newspaper paywalls too much. The virtue of these is not so much that they finance serious journalism, but rather than they disincentivize trolling and linkbait.

Secondly, there's the tendency for people to specialize in what they are best at. Mainstream journalists have an advantage over bloggers in some things - such as celebrity and Westminster gossip - but a disadvantage in other respects; such as their excessive deference and ignorance of statistics. This creates a space for intelligent blogging.

Now, of course, it would be silly to exaggerate and pretend that bloggers are all pointy-headed highbrows whilst the MSM are all trolls. Instead, I suspect blogs are a little like the BBC. There's a lot of rubbish, but the structure of incentives is such as to facilitate a minority of great work to a greater extent than is the case for the capitalist sector.

Jobs trouble

The NIESR forecasts (pdf) that unemployment will rise to almost 9% of the workforce later this year. Whilst I'm no fan of economic forecasts, there's a reason to fear it might be right. My chart shows it.

It shows that during the worst of the 2008-09 recession GDP fell far more than employment; although it was a severe recession for output, it was a relatively mild one for jobs.

We can (horribly!) roughly quantify this. If the relationship between GDP growth and employment growth had been the same since 2007Q4 as it was in the previous 20 years, the 4.3% drop in GDP since then would have caused a 3.3% fall in employment. But in fact, it fell only 1%. This means that employment is almost 700,000 higher than you'd expect, given what's happened to GDP.

Now, to some extent, this reflects a genuine slowdown in productivity, and to some extent labour hoarding. Insofar as it's the latter, we should expect two things. Some firms will respond to rising demand by increasing utilization of labour and unwinding this hoarding, rather than increasing hiring. And others, if they fail to get the recovery in demand they hope for, will trim their workforces.

On both counts, a rise in aggregate demand might not generate many net jobs.

There's a precedent for this. In the early 80s, GDP bottomed out in 1980Q4 and recovered thereafter, but it was not until early 1987 that employment returned to its 1980Q4 level.

Now, I'm not saying the jobs picture is that bad. But that episode is a warning - that even if we do get a nice recovery in output (which is a big if), jobs need not follow.