"Does reason matter?"

Matthew Parris comes up with an entry for Oliver Kamm's and John Rentoul’s series, “questions to which the answer is no”:

Does reason, does philosophy matter?

Of course they don’t. In politics - and especially on matters of freedom, there are powerful mechanisms selecting against reason:
1. Reasonable people are not fanatics, so they don’t push their views hard, whilst stupid people do. For example, there are almost certainly more people in the UK who support free migration than there are members of the BNP. But how much publicity does the BNP get compared to supporters of freedom?
Politics operates a form of the Dunning-Kruger effect - the same stupidity that causes people to have bad ideas causes them to exaggerate their importance, over-state their accuracy and to organize to promote them. And, as Adam says, decisions are made by those who turn up.
2. The media select bad ideas, as these provide scare stories.  Take immigration again.  “Migrants no problem” is not a story. “Migrant threat” is. So MigrationWatch gets free publicity, whilst advocates of free movement do not.
3. The benefits of freedom are often dispersed and unforeseeable, whilst the (alleged) benefits of restrictions are often more concentrated and salient. So opponents of freedom organize more, and are more vocal, than supporters.  The 22,000 who complained about Jan Moir’s rubbish get publicity. What doesn’t get so much publicity is the opinion that, if the Daily Mail refused to run stories that were irrational, petty-minded and bigoted, it would print nothing but the racing results and crossword.
4. Politics is a forum for cheap talk, and anything that’s cheap is of low quality. It’s easy to want to restrict other people’s freedom when you don’t have to pay to do so.

Comments

[David Michael]

Those are all good points but they don't prove that reason doesn't matter. Even if reasonable people don't push their views hard, they do at least tend to defend their positions against stupid ones.

[jameshigham]

Does reason, does philosophy matter?

Of course they don’t. In politics - and especially on matters of freedom, there are powerful mechanisms selecting against reason:

Well said.

[Paul Sagar]

"Reason is, and ought only ever to be, the slave of the passions" - David Hume

The notion that reason motivates or is superior to emotions/interests/passions was put to bed in the 18th Century. I know it's hard for an economist to accept - Homo Economus etc - but 'reason' isn't what politics is about; it's about passions and interests. You can try and make your preferred passions and interests sound more authoritative and valuable and desirable by labelling them "reason", but ultimately that's just propaganda.

I recommend Hume's Treatise, Book III Part I Chapters 1-2.

[chris]

@ Paul - pre-behavioural economists traditionally accepted Hume's point: they have regarded tastes as given, and not subject to question.
One reason for this is that they accepted a point Hume made later - that "the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition...our passions yield to our reason without any opposition."
My problem is that, in politics at least, this isn't necessarily true, in part because talk is cheap. This raises important questions about the nature and legitimacy of democracy. If democracy isn't a form of public reason, what legitimacy does it have? Why should anyone consent to be governed by the (irrational or unjustified) passions of others?

[Paul Sagar]

Ok big queations. Beware that your statement from Hume is not a claim that reason defeats or dictates to passion, but that when we realize the world is different to how we thought, our passions immediately change accordingly. It's a claim about how reaon can inform, but never motivate. It always comes back to passion - I fear the economists may have misunderstood this point.

I will get back to your points re democracy later....

[alanm crisps not dunked]

Yes, long been haunted by the certainty of politicians - when a good knowledge of a subject introduces nuance and doubt.

Knowing a little about something makes you certain then. Good, glad I am clever and not juat weak and indicisive.

[Paul Sagar]

Before I can answer your question about democracy, I need to unpack the claims you are making.

When you write:

"If democracy isn't a form of public reason, what legitimacy does it have? Why should anyone consent to be governed by the (irrational or unjustified) passions of others?"

Do you mean public reason in the technical Rawlsian sense - e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_reason - or do you mean it in some other sense?

(If you mean it in the Rawlsian sense, did you actually mean to write "If democracy isn't amenable to a public reason requirement then what legitimacy does it have?"

See, I'm trying to work out whether your complaint is about the values of democracy, or its legitimacy as a decision-making mechanism. Bearing in mind that we tend to use the word "democracy" in both senses simultaneously.