Is it just me, or do several X Factor contestants look like Arsenal players: Danyl and Eduardo; Joe and Cesc, Jedward and Nicklas Bendtner’s bollocks?
Which is a preface to saying that Jedward raise an important point about social choice theory - namely, that the public‘s “choice” can depend upon the voting rule. Take for example, three plausible rules:
1. First-past-the-post. On this rule - if the Sun is to be believed - Jedward would win, thus heralding the End of Days. This can happen because, with eight contenders, just 15% of the vote might get you victory.
2. Vote to reject a candidate. On this rule, Jedward would get the heave-ho, as most X Factor viewers do have some sort of hearing ability.
3. Sequential voting for one’s favourite candidate, with the loser eliminated at each stage. This is the rule the X Factor uses. And on this basis, Jedward are likely to be eliminated sometime, as Danny points out.
Depending on which rule we use, then, Jedward are either the most popular act, the least popular, or middleingly popular. "Public opinion" is indeterminate.
Sunder sees this as an argument electoral reform - for adopting an X Factor-type rule.
I’m not sure. This gives weight to second, third or even lower order preferences, which might be weak. This might explain why some X Factor winners - Steve Brookstein, Leon Jackson - have not had much success; the public just didn’t care enough about them to buy their records. It's moot whether weak preferences should count in politics or not.
Instead, my inference here is an Arrovian one. If we have so little information about public preferences - just votes, rather than any data about the reasons for or intensity of those preferences - then it can be impossible to identify for sure what the public want.
Which in turn raises a question about the nature of democracy. Could it be that what is valuable about democracy is not the voting rule as such? Instead, what matters is the lead-up to the vote, as discussion reveals the strength and (ir)rationality of preferences. If so, what is needed is not so much electoral reform as greater deliberative democracy.
Which is a preface to saying that Jedward raise an important point about social choice theory - namely, that the public‘s “choice” can depend upon the voting rule. Take for example, three plausible rules:
1. First-past-the-post. On this rule - if the Sun is to be believed - Jedward would win, thus heralding the End of Days. This can happen because, with eight contenders, just 15% of the vote might get you victory.
2. Vote to reject a candidate. On this rule, Jedward would get the heave-ho, as most X Factor viewers do have some sort of hearing ability.
3. Sequential voting for one’s favourite candidate, with the loser eliminated at each stage. This is the rule the X Factor uses. And on this basis, Jedward are likely to be eliminated sometime, as Danny points out.
Depending on which rule we use, then, Jedward are either the most popular act, the least popular, or middleingly popular. "Public opinion" is indeterminate.
Sunder sees this as an argument electoral reform - for adopting an X Factor-type rule.
I’m not sure. This gives weight to second, third or even lower order preferences, which might be weak. This might explain why some X Factor winners - Steve Brookstein, Leon Jackson - have not had much success; the public just didn’t care enough about them to buy their records. It's moot whether weak preferences should count in politics or not.
Instead, my inference here is an Arrovian one. If we have so little information about public preferences - just votes, rather than any data about the reasons for or intensity of those preferences - then it can be impossible to identify for sure what the public want.
Which in turn raises a question about the nature of democracy. Could it be that what is valuable about democracy is not the voting rule as such? Instead, what matters is the lead-up to the vote, as discussion reveals the strength and (ir)rationality of preferences. If so, what is needed is not so much electoral reform as greater deliberative democracy.
"I’m not sure. This gives weight to second, third or even lower order preferences, which might be weak."
Not equal weighting -- they're merely used in the case of no overall candidate gaining majority popularity, which is fair enough. If you wanted a voting system that resulted in secondary preferences being given a far greater rating, then I'd suggest Borda Count and Condorcet methods.
Posted by: David | November 06, 2009 at 07:48 PM
The reason Brookstein and Jackson didn't sell records is that they were the best of a poor crop. This year's winner will be similar.
And so will next June's.
Posted by: InfoholicUK | November 08, 2009 at 10:40 AM
Can't agree, first past the post practically ensures regular disastrous decisions, and particularly can have nasty intraparty consequences. Look at the USA recently. I prefer preferential voting (for instance the Australian system) but proportional voting systems mostly work out OK (but then again there was Hitler).
I always put it this way, in Australia we vote for the least unpopular politician, under FPTP you vote for the most popular. It says something about the way you look at policians doesn't it.
Posted by: reason | November 09, 2009 at 10:03 AM
Your argument about wishy-washyness is an example of a poor analogy. A wishy-washy government is not necessarily a worse choice than a dangerously controversial one (ask Germany for instance).
Posted by: reason | November 09, 2009 at 10:05 AM