Levi-Leleu's case: a Humean view

Who is the rightful owner of Pierre Levi-Leleu's suitcase? It's easy to mistake the issue here, as one of utilitarianism versus natural rights.
The Auschwitz museum's case for owning the case is a utilitarian one. The most valuable use to which the battered case can be put is as a public, historical artefact, rather than a piece of mouldering private property. Here's Norm:

If the Auschwitz museum also has a claim on the suitcase, as I think it does, it's simply that the suitcase has become a sort of public document - a historical relic that has educational value.

Danny Finkelstein objects that this over-rides the rights of Mr Levi-Leleu's son, Michel:

The authorities are saying that Michel’s individual feelings, his personal rights, his claim to this last scrap, don’t matter. They are saying that they know better, that their rights to the stolen property of a murdered man are greater than those of his son. It is a monumental piece of arrogance and a terrible intimation that even the guardians of that awful memorial site haven’t learnt all the lessons it should be teaching us.

If we interpret the issue as one of utilitarianism versus natural right, I side with the Auschwitz authorities.
This is because Michel doesn't have a right to the case. Put it this way. Imagine Pierre had lived his natural lifespan. He could have thrown the case out or given it away, and his son would have had no right to stop him. Why, then, should we assume Michel has a natural right of inheritance? Such a right might not exist at all, as Stewart Braun argues here (pdf).
If M. Levi-Leleu has no right to the case, it's easy to believe it should go where it can do most good - the museum.
However, there's another way of looking at this issue, which supports Mr Finkelstein's argument. David Hume made it in his Treatise of Human Nature:

A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to stand alone, without being follow'd by other acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to society...But however single acts of justice may be contrary, either to public or private interest, `tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and the well-being of every individual. Tis impossible to separate the good from the ill. Property must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules.

Justice requires that we have big sanctions against theft. One of these sanctions is that the general public must not benefit from theft. So, the Auschwitz museum must give the case to M. Levi-Leleu, even though it is "prejudicial to society" to do so. This is because it's more important to uphold the principle that theft is wrong, as this principle benefits society most in the long-run. Returning the case to M. Levi-Leleu is, on this view, a rule-utilitarian move, not an act-utilitarian one.
We don't, therefore, need suspect arguments about natural rights to property to side with M. Levi-Leleu.

Comments

[Backword Dave]

That was pretty much my argument. You put it better, of course.

[james higham]

"If the Auschwitz museum also has a claim on the suitcase, as I think it does, it's simply that the suitcase has become a sort of public document - a historical relic that has educational value."

Chris, sadly, this might be the case.

[dearieme]

You are assuming, I take it, that Polish Law of the period would not have determined whom the case belonged to? Because if it did, surely Clever Davie's argument would tell you just to honour the law?

[Charlie Whitaker]

Isn't there a 'rule utilitarian' view of the holocaust? The principle of making sure that people are educated about it, which benefits society most in the long run?

[Hypereides]

As Dearieme suggests, presumably the ownership of the (in English law) chattels at Auschwitz and/or ownership of the Museum contents has been determined by Polish law. This can be ascertained, though presumably subject to challenge on Convention and/or Polish Constitution grounds. What is the basis for the son's claim to ownership by inheritance of such a specific article? In England and Wales, the estate would vest in the personal representatives, including such items, unless left as specific legacies, who could dispose of them as they saw fit to pay debts and expenses, etc., surely, without residuary legatees or heirs on intestacy having a claim to receive in specie. Which state's law of succesion would apply in this case? And what would it provide?(This is all just to suggest that succession to property, like property itself, is a complex structure of legal artefacts, derived from a constantly changing amalgam of tradition, policy and principle, rather than the natural fact or obvious natural right that Finkelstein, for instance, seemed to think.)

If the suitcase had been distributed by the authority upon liberation to a survivor or taken by one, whether regularized or not, would anyone suppose that, in the circumstances, theft? Certainly, one would think Hume -very much one for law, and specifically rights of property, giving way to necessity in emergency- would be hardly likely to. There are many occasions from famine to fire when the public benefit positively requires appropriation, consimption without consent, or destruction of private property.

[Paulie]

I'm slightly puzzled by the introduction of legal juristiction in this case. Was Polish Law even operating in Poland at the time? What if M. Levi-Leleu had been resident in Germany at the time? Would we be discussing this in the context of German law?

Didn't the Nazis have any some provision in law to reallocate the property of Jews? And if they had have done, would this be a factor in this discussion here?

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