The violence in Zimbabwe raises a problem for the theory of liberal interventionism that I fear doesn’t get the attention it deserves. It’s about selection effects.
The problem is that dictators select their own populations, by killing democrats or sending them into exile. As a result, the longer and more brutal is the dictatorship, the harder it will be to establish democracy afterwards. This is because the people able and willing to build democracy will be dead or leading new lives in exile, whilst supporters of the old regime and enemies of democracy will be numerous and well-armed.
Which leads to two paradoxes of interventionism:
1. The more necessary is intervention, the less likely it is to succeed, because the most savage dictators select against democrats more ruthlessly. It’s been harder to build democracy in Iraq than in the eastern Europe in part because Saddam selected against democrats more ruthlessly than did the Communist party.
2. By the time the “international community” (yuk) has gathered enough evidence and support to intervene, it’s too late to do so most effectively - which is when the dictator’s opponents are still alive.
The obvious solution to these paradoxes is to prevent dictatorships arising in the first place - though how this is to be done is a tougher question. But this is, of course, no help to Zimbabweans.
The problem is that dictators select their own populations, by killing democrats or sending them into exile. As a result, the longer and more brutal is the dictatorship, the harder it will be to establish democracy afterwards. This is because the people able and willing to build democracy will be dead or leading new lives in exile, whilst supporters of the old regime and enemies of democracy will be numerous and well-armed.
Which leads to two paradoxes of interventionism:
1. The more necessary is intervention, the less likely it is to succeed, because the most savage dictators select against democrats more ruthlessly. It’s been harder to build democracy in Iraq than in the eastern Europe in part because Saddam selected against democrats more ruthlessly than did the Communist party.
2. By the time the “international community” (yuk) has gathered enough evidence and support to intervene, it’s too late to do so most effectively - which is when the dictator’s opponents are still alive.
The obvious solution to these paradoxes is to prevent dictatorships arising in the first place - though how this is to be done is a tougher question. But this is, of course, no help to Zimbabweans.
"'International community' (yuk)"
- now that's a good counter-hegemonic meme.
Posted by: Chris Williams | June 23, 2008 at 02:40 PM
You're correct that the solution is to prevent dictatorships arising in the first place - prevention is always better than cure, after all - but we should also develop better ways of supporting those inside the country whose politics we believe will serve their people better. The international attention lavished on Darfur is wasted partly because the rebel groups don't appear to be necessarily better than the government in key areas like human rights; the lack of similar attention on Zimbabwe, where it would have had more effect, is a little distressing.
Posted by: Paul C | June 23, 2008 at 05:36 PM
"The problem is that dictators select their own populations, by killing democrats or sending them into exile."
Most dictators have only a slight demographic effect. Probably a bigger effect is the destruction by the dictator of institutions designed to restrict the power of the ruler.
Posted by: ad | June 23, 2008 at 07:33 PM
"The more necessary is intervention, the less likely it is to succeed, because the most savage dictators select against democrats more ruthlessly."
Some of us are waiting for you to factor Nazi Germany into this rather neat little concept. Once you've done that, maybe you could have a shot at Japan?
Posted by: Shuggy | June 23, 2008 at 08:42 PM
Neither of those were interventions against dictatorship: they were interventions against expansionism and aggression. Other dictators (Stalin, Franco, Salazar, the Sauds) had a fine time of it through the 1940s.
Posted by: Chris Williams | June 23, 2008 at 10:58 PM
I will be packing my bags for Zimbabwe the day ZANU goes. I just hope they give me back my passport.
My experience of countries elsewhere in Africa is that even with the return of democracy builders and the exit of totalitarian fascists (for that is what many African leaders are)- it is really difficult to shift economies based of patronage - around which entire cultures are based.
Posted by: Democracy Loving Economist | June 24, 2008 at 07:29 AM
Shuggy - in addition to Chris William's point, I imagine Mr. Dillow was avoiding invoking Nazi Germany to help us all steer clear of Godwin's law.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin%27s_law
Posted by: Jake | June 24, 2008 at 09:46 AM
One of my lecturer's described the neo-cons as the armed wing of oxfam. new meme - just cos we're 'western' doesn't mean we can solve everyone's problems.
Posted by: councilhousetory | June 24, 2008 at 10:48 AM
Why would this be glossed as a problem for liberal interventionism? Surely it's the same, or even more of a, problem for people who think that intervention is always wrong, that democracy, rule of law etc. will emerge naturally over time?
Posted by: Chris | June 24, 2008 at 03:47 PM
"Neither of those were interventions against dictatorship: they were interventions against expansionism and aggression. Other dictators (Stalin, Franco, Salazar, the Sauds) had a fine time of it through the 1940s."
Mentally filed under 'missing the point' - yours being, it seems, some boring point about Western/liberal inconsistency, which doesn't alter my point. Redux:
"As a result, the longer and more brutal is the dictatorship, the harder it will be to establish democracy afterwards."
I think Nazi Germany qualifies as a 'brutal dictatorship' by most people's definition.
See, I can do patronising too. I get paid for it, as a matter of fact.
Posted by: Shuggy | June 24, 2008 at 08:01 PM
? I wasn't making a point about liberal inconsistency, merely that the Allies in WW2 weren't intervening to save the poor oppressed masses, they were defeating their enemies in order to stop them invading other countries. Rebuilding democracy (or in Italy and Japan, 'democracy') was not the raison d'etre but a necessary end to the job. So the cases compare very badly indeed with the archetypical 'liberal invention' case which Chris D was discussing, where the victims are purely internal, and the wars are from the realpolitik perspective wars of choice.
As for your second point, remember that the Nazis only got 12 years at the mike. Japan was also more plural in the 1920s than it became in the 1930s.
Posted by: Chris Williams | June 24, 2008 at 10:01 PM
A superb illustration of your undocumented assertion is, of course, Portugal.
Posted by: 4degreesnorth | June 24, 2008 at 10:57 PM
On the efficacy of intervention by the US, we've at least got this:
http://www.amazon.com/After-War-Political-Exporting-Democracy/dp/0804754403
Chris Coyne shows that for the US, it's been successful only about 20% of the time, Germany and Japan being obvious.
Quick summary, the latter point very Hayekian:
1) Lack of percieved legitimacy
2) Lack of knowledge of informal institutions
Posted by: Dain | June 25, 2008 at 03:46 AM