Let’s say you want greater equality of incomes within the UK. How do you try to win others round to this view?
You could assert the moral case for equality as a value in itself. But this would convince few others, especially those who took recourse in the Hayekian or Nozickian counterarguments. Instead, wouldn’t you have more luck trying some other routes?:
1. You could argue the facts - the rich are not admirable and deserving, and the poor are not scroungers.
2. You could make other arguments for equality - that it might increase economic growth or reduce (pdf) crime (pdf). I’d add that too that it can promote freedom even in the libertarian sense, as a society in which there was greater support for the poor would be one in which more intrusive forms of state intervention would be redundant; there’d be no need for minimum wage laws, labour market regulation or windfall taxes.
3. You could argue that the perceived adverse correlates of income equality needn’t exist. For example, a citizens basic income and cuts in corporate welfare could increase income equality and shrink the state.
Wouldn’t these lines of argument have more appeal to the undecided than mere straightforward moral arguments for equality? Don’t they give us more chance of at least deepening our understanding and have a meaningful, illuminating discussion than just defending equality as a moral ideal? Don’t they better promote the case for equality?
Of course, Norm’s right in the sense that my arguments for effects which are “beneficial even in terms of some non-egalitarian outlook” is also a form of moral justification. But this defines “moral argument” so widely as to include pretty much anything.
In this context we can draw a distinction between two types of argument. One type - outlined above - takes the premise: “OK, you disagree with me. How might I persuade you?”
However, too many arguments take the form: “You disagree with me. You are wrong and I am right.” The upshot is utterly futile name-calling - almost any “debate” about, say, Israel or abortion, falls into this category.
Which is where arguments about morality often fall. This needn’t always be so. But in practice it is. Which is why I prefer other forms of thinking.
You could assert the moral case for equality as a value in itself. But this would convince few others, especially those who took recourse in the Hayekian or Nozickian counterarguments. Instead, wouldn’t you have more luck trying some other routes?:
1. You could argue the facts - the rich are not admirable and deserving, and the poor are not scroungers.
2. You could make other arguments for equality - that it might increase economic growth or reduce (pdf) crime (pdf). I’d add that too that it can promote freedom even in the libertarian sense, as a society in which there was greater support for the poor would be one in which more intrusive forms of state intervention would be redundant; there’d be no need for minimum wage laws, labour market regulation or windfall taxes.
3. You could argue that the perceived adverse correlates of income equality needn’t exist. For example, a citizens basic income and cuts in corporate welfare could increase income equality and shrink the state.
Wouldn’t these lines of argument have more appeal to the undecided than mere straightforward moral arguments for equality? Don’t they give us more chance of at least deepening our understanding and have a meaningful, illuminating discussion than just defending equality as a moral ideal? Don’t they better promote the case for equality?
Of course, Norm’s right in the sense that my arguments for effects which are “beneficial even in terms of some non-egalitarian outlook” is also a form of moral justification. But this defines “moral argument” so widely as to include pretty much anything.
In this context we can draw a distinction between two types of argument. One type - outlined above - takes the premise: “OK, you disagree with me. How might I persuade you?”
However, too many arguments take the form: “You disagree with me. You are wrong and I am right.” The upshot is utterly futile name-calling - almost any “debate” about, say, Israel or abortion, falls into this category.
Which is where arguments about morality often fall. This needn’t always be so. But in practice it is. Which is why I prefer other forms of thinking.
Great post.
The difficulty, of course, is that once you start deconstructing your own moral values to make more reasoned arguments, you end up with nothing to tie your logic to. I take equality to be a value in itself, just as I take something more inane like... our obligation to minimise suffering.
Once I define the foremost in economic terms, what's to stop someone asking for a costs-benefits analysis of, say, torturing babies?
More to the point, they can take apart the first of your arguments by saying something, "Well, who cares about justice?". The second dissipates with a swift, "Freedom? Crime? I feel very free and very safe in my 16 bedroom mansion, with its 24 hour surveillance security, thank you very much."
At some point, you have to put an absolute into play. Otherwise, nobody wins.
Posted by: Andrew F | September 07, 2008 at 03:42 AM
Hi Chris, I just wanted to thank you for the link, interesting post as usual! BG
Posted by: Bendy Girl | September 07, 2008 at 08:56 PM
Should we trust animal rights advocates who argue that animal experiments are scientifically useless? (No.)
So should we trust the arguments of equality advocates who find other reasons for equality-minded interventions?
Of course my animal rights example is an easy one because we can tell that the suggestion is bunk. By contrast you are probably right to some extent about growth and crime and merit.
But it might be hard to find the best policies for growth, crime and merit, if the debate is polarised according to belief in equality.
Posted by: Joe Otten | September 07, 2008 at 09:20 PM
This and your other posts on morality, or moral reasoning seem to me to fail for one basic reason. They ignore that the fact the case for equality or any other state of affair cannot be made on anything other than moral grounds. Whatever the economic grounds are for equality, they would also have to be grounds that are desirable (prudent) as well as meet our approval (moral). Why would we even seek to make the case for equality, if not for some moral reason/s?
"1. You could argue the facts - the rich are not admirable and deserving, and the poor are not scroungers."
Firstly, how are we to understand words like 'admirable' without a world of value. The word is itself a moral judgement. Secondly, such a statement is not a fact, but depending on the moral world employed, it may be a moral fact.
"2. You could make other arguments for equality - that it might increase economic growth or reduce (pdf) crime (pdf). I’d add that too that it can promote freedom even in the libertarian sense,..."
And each of these arguments would nevertheless depend upon a moral view that valued economic growth, or less crime, or more freedom.
"Of course, Norm’s right in the sense that my arguments for effects which are “beneficial even in terms of some non-egalitarian outlook” is also a form of moral justification. But this defines “moral argument” so widely as to include pretty much anything."
Well, not quite. Its not that moral reasoning is here drawn too widely, its simply the fact that all practical judgements are themselves moral judgements because the imply a world of value.
The problem with your series of arguments is that you, as has been pointed out, have conflated moralism with moral reasoning and in the process neutered your own evaluative (moral) judgements into the bargain.
Still, as a first-time visitor I like your blog and will return.
Posted by: dover_beach | September 09, 2008 at 07:24 AM
Could the rule of diminishing returns be used to argue for increased equality?
The overall welfare of a society with one member having an income of £1 million and 100 members with £10,000 is probably lower than an equally productive society with one member having an income of £500,000 and 100 with incomes of £15,000. This stands to reason to me as one member has his wealth halved (though he remains 'rich') but 100 members have their wealth increased by 50%. Then again I'm not a student of economics so I could have made some logical error there.
Posted by: Ted | September 09, 2008 at 02:31 PM