Stumbling and Mumbling

The cost-cutting error

It's being said that the government is looking to cut costs. Such a framing is in many cases wrong and dangerous.

To take an example, in this clip the BBC's Jon Kay puts it to Jonathan Reynolds that "we can't afford [the pensions triple lock]; the economy can't afford it...so how are you going to afford it?"

The problem here is that cutting real-terms state pensions is not a saving. A lower state pension means that younger people must either save more privately for their old age or work longer (or both). Cutting the state pension therefore does not save money. It merely shifts the cost of provision for old age from the collective to individuals. To speak of the government cutting costs in this context is therefore plain wrong. It's not cutting costs, but merely shifting them.

The same applies to some other possible government cost savings. In scrimping on hospital provision the government has pushed NHS waiting lists up to record highs, one effect of which is to increase the number of people going for private treatment. Again, what's happening here is not that the government is cutting a cost, but that it is transferring it - from the state to those who can afford to go private.

An even more obvious example of what I mean are benefit cuts. These merely transfer costs from government to benefit recipients who must cut their spending and lead meaner lives.

The cost does not fall on them alone, however. It also falls upon those companies who suffer lower demand when benefit recipients cut spending. When Tesco chairman John Allan says we have "a moral responsibility" to look after people suffering from the cost of living crisis, he's appealing to the government to help his firm. Smarter capitalists know that austerity hurts them too.

In cases such as these, therefore, talk of the government cutting costs is plain wrong. What it is doing is shifting the costs, from the collective to individuals.

In this cases, the key question is: who is best able to bear costs - the state or individual?

In the case of pensions, I think the answer is clear - the state. Private pension provision is difficult and expensive. Not only do we face high fees from the organized theft that is the fund management industry, but we also face investment risk and longevity risk. The state is better on all three counts.

Similarly, scrimping on NHS spending introduces risk into our lives - that of being impoverished by ill-health. Benefit cuts have a similar effect, forcing individuals and retailers into being more exposed to bad economic times. They therefore weaken the automatic stabilizers that help protect us from recession.

In all three cases, the Tories are stepping back from a classic function of the state, which is to pool risks. It is transferring risk from government to individuals, who must take more investment risk, risk of impoverishment by ill-health, or risk of income loss in bad times. In this context asking "how great is the 'black hole' in the public finances?" is the wrong question. The question is: which costs and risks should be borne by the state and which by individuals?

This is not to say however that all possible government cuts are merely shifting costs.

One pure cost saving would be the reduction in the deadweight costs of administering taxes and benefits. Shifting taxes from incomes to land would be one such saving; land taxes don't have the disincentive effects that other taxes do. So too would simplifying the benefit system.

Other cost savings would be reducing the functions of the police, for example by legalizing drugs. Yet another would be cutting military spending: if you cut health spending, we might buy a private operation, but if you cut military spending we'll not buy our own private nuclear weapons. You can think of other examples.

You might reply that even in these cases, cutting government spending is not a pure cost saving as it entails job losses. Not necessarily. We are close to full employment, which means we must consider not only the volume of employment but the nature of it: do we really want arms manufacturers and a surveillance state rather than care workers and medical equipment?

Now, you might quibble with my individual judgments of particular cases. But I think the distinction I'm making between cost savings and cost transfers is robust and important. What we must ask is not whether the government needs to find savings, but other questions: what costs must be borne by the state and which by individuals? And what goods and services do we want more of, and what less?

(Non) lessons of the fiasco

All of us tend to interpret political events as confirming our prior beliefs. We must, however, resist this temptation when thinking about the now-reversed Kwarteng/Truss Budget. There are two interpretations of this fiasco which are not as robust as you might think.

The first one is that it shows that small state conservatism is impossible. I don't think this inference is warranted.

Imagine that Budget had been announced at a time of recession when inflation was below target and both short and long-term interest rates near zero. In such circumstances, I suspect markets would applaud: looser fiscal policy is the right thing to do then - as many of us were saying in 2010-12. Yes, bond yields would rise - but that's natural and desirable as a consequence of escaping recession, and it's possible that gilt losses would be accompanied by share price rises.

Of course, we would quibble with the redistributive impact of cuts to top taxes, and we'd argue that spending rises would be better at reflating the economy than tax cuts. But in macroeconomic terms, the Kwarteng-Truss Budget would have been acceptable.

And a few years after the Budget, Kwarteng/Truss could claim not only that they had averted recession, but also that subsequent growth had been good. Yes, orthodox economists would reply that this was due more to standard accelerator effects and diminished uncertainty than to supply-side effects of tax cuts. But that's the point: we would be debating whether tax cuts had worked. We wouldn't be claiming that the Kwarteng/Truss approach had been refuted.

This counterfactual tells us that the fatal flaw in the Kwarteng/Truss Budget was its macroeconomic judgement, not its supply-side measures.

Let's try another counterfactual. Imagine their Budget had been announced after a positive supply shock - something that had both boosted growth and reduced inflation. Tax cuts would then look "affordable", because the stronger economy had reduced government borrowing. Nobody would panic. The way to shrink the state, remember, is to have a strong economy.

What would such a supply shock be? One candidate would be sharp reversal of this year's oil and gas price rises. The right, however, might add another candidate: non-fiscal supply-side measures such as planning reform. On that view, the Kwarteng/Truss error has been to do policy in the wrong order: tax cuts should have followed other supply-side policies, not preceded them.

Now, personally I am of course very sceptical that cuts to top tax rates would greatly stimulate the supply-side. But this scepticism is not enhanced by the Tories' latest fiasco. What this proves is that their macroeconomic and market judgement is atrocious. It does not prove that rightist supply-side measures are always doomed to fail. To establish that, you need other evidence.

There is another hypothesis which I think is unproven by recent events. This is that, contrary to the claim of modern monetary theory, bond markets are in themselves a constraint on government borrowing.

My problem with this idea is that we've seen bonds sell off at a time of high inflation. It is possible that what gilt markets are worried about, therefore, is not a flood of issuance but simply that tax cuts will further add to inflation. On this view, MMTers are right. It is indeed inflation that is the constraint upon government borrowing. Bond markets are merely a mechanism through which this constraint becomes obvious to government.

Of course, something would refute MMT - if we were seeing bonds sell off at a time of low inflation. But this is not what's happening.

There is, however, a wrinkle here. What we've seen since the summer is not just a rise in nominal gilt yields but also a sharp rise in real ones too. You might think this consistent with the market fearing a glut of debt, not just inflation - that markets are, in Paul Krugman's words, pricing in a "moron risk premium."

Possibly, but not certainly.

For one thing, this risk premium might reflect not the quantity of debt but rather the manner of conducting policy: in sacking Sir Tom Scholar and sidelining the OBR, Kwarteng/Truss signalled that they were heedless of dissonant voices. That's just bad policy-making.

For another, higher real yields are themselves a sign the markets fear inflation. Real yields are higher because markets expect higher real short-term interest rates. Which is just what should happen as the Bank tries to reduce inflation.

And for a third thing, even now real yields are well below their 1990s levels. In a longer-term context the bond market vigilantes are still softies.

This issue matters for how the left should think about fiscal policy. If the problem is indeed too much borrowing then there might be a case for wealth taxes merely to raise revenue. If, however, the problem is inflation then wealth taxes are a less good solution: insofar as the rich don't spend their wealth, such taxes won't much reduce inflation.

My point here is to try to lean against the old habit of seeing our prejudices confirmed everywhere. Macroeconomics and politics are often afflicted with the Duhem-Quine problem, that hypotheses can never be tested in isolation. Recent events do not prove that small-state supply-side policies are impossible, and nor do they prove that the bond market and not inflation is the constraint upon borrowing. Maybe they are, maybe not - but this fiasco does not establish so much.

Instead, it proves just one thing - that the Tory reputation for economic competence was not justified. And perhaps it never was.

Origins of the Tory implosion

The implosion of the Tory party suggests I was wrong.

I had thought that economic stagnation - which has seen real wages fall below 2007 levels - would benefit the Tories. As Ben Friedman showed, a weak economy leads to illiberalism and reactionary politics which creates a constituency for culture war politics and attacks on migrants, "wokesters" and the EU. Also, the low real interest rates caused by stagnation sustain house prices thus giving older home-owners an illusion of wealth, whilst at the same time boosting the profits of some financiers who back the Tory party.

This seemed to be the case until recently: the Tories led Labour in the polls until this year, and even in the summer had only a small deficit. But no longer. Labour now has a 30pp lead, predicting the wipeout of the Tory party at the next election.

So what changed?

Putin, that's what. His invasion of Ukraine caused energy prices to soar, with the result that the cost of living crisis increased in salience, whilst culture wars diminished. Which has revealed a division in the Tory party.

This division arises from a brute economic fact. You can have both low taxes and decent public services only if you have a strong economy: history tells us that the shares of taxes and state spending in GDP are driven more by economic fluctuations than by government ideology.

Fifteen years of economic stagnation therefore forces Tories to choose: you can have tax cuts, or you can avoid cuts to welfare benefits and public services. But you cannot have both.

For years, the Tories have dodged this question by talking little about economics and more about culture wars, of which Brexit is a part. That is now no longer an option: those Tory MPs who moan about migrants and Harry Potter courses at universities merely embarrass themselves.

Kwarteng tried to dodge this question by pretending that tax cuts would stimulate growth or that the government could easily borrow to cut taxes. Neither claim survived more than a few days.

For one thing, there is little (pdf) evidence that lower taxes do stimulate growth. The UK economy grew much better when the Kinks complained that "the taxman's taken all my dough" than it did in the years after Nigella's dad cut the top rate to 40%*.

And for another, government borrowing has gotten more expensive: five-year nominal yields have jumped from 0.8% to over 4% so far this year. That's partly because of a rise in global yields, and partly because we are now closer to full employment and the point at which looser fiscal policy leads to inflation rather than real growth. It's also because the government has reduced confidence in UK assets by sacking Sir Tom Scholar and sidelining the OBR; the US can afford to elect a braindead ideologue because it has exorbitant privilege but the UK cannot be so cavalier about international perceptions and so doesn't have that option.

The Tory dilemma is therefore acute: tax cuts or public services? Of course, many Tories have an ideological instinct for tax cuts. But they also have a predilection for "sound finance" and - even more so - for getting elected. And with voters not wanting a smaller state (pdf) they cannot have all three.

Let's be clear, though. The issue here is not only ideology and electoral considerations. Underpinning it is 15 years of economic stagnation. Just as poverty-stricken individuals face horrible choices, so too do countries. In fairness to them, Truss and Kwarteng realize this - hence their concern to raise economic growth. Sadly, though, they are unaware that achieving this requires years of hard slog and that the enemies of growth exist in their own party - in Brexiteers, nimbys and financiers and rentiers who benefit from the low interest rates that stagnation usually brings.

The Tories had the luck or skill to avoid these choices for years by fostering culture wars, which led me to think stagnation would continue to benefit them. I was wrong, because economics has now become the centre of party politics again. Tory divisions and unpopularity are not just the unfortunate result of having profoundly inadequate personnel. They are the product of underlying economic forces.

* Between 1948 and 1971 (when the top income tax rate averaged 90%) UK real GDP grew by an average of 3.3% a year: since 1988, when it was cut to 40%, it has grown only 1.9%.

Another thing. All this, I think, is an example of a point the great Jon Elster made in Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. The social sciences, he wrote, are a box of mechanisms. But we often cannot foretell which mechanism will operate more strongly. So whilst there are some mechanisms linking stagnation to Tories thriving, there are others linking it to their demise. What we've seen is a shift from one to the other. As Elster wrote, "sometimes we can explain without being able to predict." (Personally, I don't see this as a great defect in the social sciences - but that's another story.)